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The Transformation of the Labor Market under the Influence of Artificial Intelligence: Automation of Professions, the Emergence of New Specialties, and Changes in Career Trajectories

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Abstract

This study examines the impact of artificial intelligence on the labor market. Neural networks have become a scientific breakthrough, driving changes across various fields of human activity. The study lists professions that have already undergone automation and describes the process. Additionally, it explores new professions that have emerged as a result of artificial intelligence implementation in many companies. The relevance of the study is driven by the widespread adoption of AI. The findings suggest that similar processes have occurred in the past and that AI development creates new opportunities rather than eliminating them. Technologies are designed to simplify human life, including professional activities. It is also argued that not all professions can be replaced by artificial intelligence; however, neural networks can facilitate the work of professionals, including doctors and teachers, if integrated effectively. The study hypothesizes that in the near future, large companies will need to implement artificial intelligence to maintain their competitiveness.

Keywords: AI; labor market; artificial intelligence; neural networks; AI impact on the labor market; professions; new professions.

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1. Introduction

Artificial intelligence (AI) has advanced from narrow, rule-bound algorithms to generative models capable of producing original text, code and imagery, extending automation into cognitive territory once thought uniquely human. Recent assessments by global institutions (IMF, OECD, WEF) concur that a substantial share of today's work tasks is already technically automatable, while employer surveys anticipate equally significant waves of new AI-related roles. In parallel, commercial investment in AI hardware and software is expanding at a pace unmatched by earlier ICT cycles, signalling that the technology's diffusion will reach far beyond the digital sector.

Existing scholarship tends to examine either displacement risk or skill-biased job creation; few studies treat these forces as two sides of the same structural transition or disaggregate them by industry and task composition. Addressing that gap, the present article pursues three objectives:

1. Quantify the depth and distribution of occupational exposure to AI across major industries;
2. Identify emergent specialties and skill clusters catalysed by generative technologies;
3. Distil implications for firms, workers and policy makers under alternative adoption scenarios.

Section 2 outlines the evidence-synthesis protocol that combines institutional datasets with peer-reviewed and industry sources. Section 3 presents market-growth metrics and a sector-level risk matrix; Section 4 interprets the findings, situates them within the broader literature and specifies study limitations. The conclusion reflects on the conditions under which AI can enhance productivity and job quality rather than deepen structural dislocation.

2. Methods and Materials

This investigation employs a structured evidence-synthesis protocol that merges a focused literature review with secondary-data triangulation.

Macro-economic baselines are taken from Georgieva's IMF commentary, which projects that AI will affect about 40 percent of global jobs and up to 60 percent in advanced economies—figures that frame the upper-bound automation scenario analysed here [1]. Technical foundations for generative models are drawn from Hrishchaty's survey of neural-network architectures and data-pre-processing pipelines, which clarifies the assumptions behind the study's traditional-versus-generative AI dichotomy [2]. Larichev's taxonomy of AI systems, organised by learning paradigm, further refines that conceptual split and is used to structure Table 1 [3].

Labour-market exposure metrics are sourced from three large-scale institutional studies. The OECD Employment Outlook 2024 estimates that occupations with the highest shares of automatable tasks account for ≈ 28 % of jobs across member countries [4]. OECD AI Papers No. 12 (2024) finds that 31 % of online vacancies already require AI-exposed skill bundles [5]. The WEF Future of Jobs Report 2023 forecasts a 23 % structural job churn (69 million roles created, 83 million displaced) by 2027 [6]. These datasets anchor the article's quantitative risk bands and scenario parameters.

Peer-reviewed regional work by Magomaev, Sidorov and Nemchinova charts the re-allocation of Russian employment towards digital–analytical roles and informs the construction of the author's three-tier risk typology [7]. Complementary industry evidence is supplied by TAdviser (diffusion rates for AI solutions), Konkurent.ru (production-floor and service-sector case studies), and SecurityLab.ru (occupation-specific risk segmentation) [8–10].

Together, these sources provide a triangulated empirical base for the occupational risk tables and trend analyses presented in the next section.

3. Results

3.1 Quantitative Estimates of AI Market Growth

AI now spans a continuum from traditional, task-specific systems to generative, content-creating models (Table 1). Traditional engines—fraud detectors, email spam filters, voice assistants—learn on labelled data and optimise pre-defined choices. Generative architectures such as GPT-4 and DALL-E, trained on vast unlabelled corpora, synthesise original text, code or images and therefore extend automation from routine execution to higher-order cognition [3, 5].

Table 1: Traditional versus Generative AI (adapted from [3])

Dimension	Traditional AI	Generative AI
Core goal	Decision support, pattern recognition	Novel content creation
Typical learning regime	Supervised / reinforcement on labelled data	Self-supervised pre-training + RLHF
Output space	Finite, rule-bounded	Open-ended, probabilistic
Key limitations	Domain rigidity; costly annotation	"Hallucination", provenance & IP issues
Canonical examples	Spam filters, Netflix recommender, Siri	GPT-4, Midjourney, Copilot

The commercial scale of this dual trajectory is already visible. Independent market research values the global AI sector at USD 638 billion in 2024 and projects USD 3.68 trillion by 2034 (CAGR ≈ 19 %), confirming an investment path that will outpace aggregate ICT spending (Figure 1) [9, 11]. Such growth synchronises with labour-market exposure metrics reported by the OECD, which finds that occupations with the highest share of automatable tasks already account for ≈ 28 % of employment across its 38 member countries [12]. Complementary vacancy analytics in OECD AI Papers No. 12 show that one-third of online job postings fall into "high-AI-exposure" roles, and fully 72 % of those ads demand management skills while 67 % require business-process competences [5]. Echoing these signals, the WEF *Future of Jobs 2023* survey anticipates a 23 % structural churn—69 million jobs created and 83 million displaced—by 2027 as firms scale up AI [6].



Figure 1: Revenue of the Artificial Intelligence Technology Industry, million $ [11]

Together, these macro indicators provide the numerical baseline for the sector-by-sector evidence that follows.

3.2 Automation of Professions under the Influence of AI

Evidence from company roll-outs and regulatory filings shows that AI substitutes first for routine cognitive and predictable manual tasks, while complementing human judgement in complex or relational work:

- Industrial manufacturing. Vision-enabled cobots now perform real-time defect detection on 41 % of global production lines reported in the WEF sample, shifting shop-floor workers into robot-maintenance and data-ops functions.
- Retail. Self-checkout lanes constitute roughly 30 % of North-American checkout capacity; cashier tasks shrink while demand rises for systems technicians and data analysts.

- Customer support. Telecom pilots indicate that generative chat-bots resolve ~60 % of Tier-1 queries; remaining agents specialise in escalation handling and model fine-tuning.
- Healthcare. More than 500 AI/ML diagnostic devices cleared by the FDA by 2025 triage imaging workload, allowing radiographers to focus on complex or ambiguous cases.
- Finance, logistics, marketing and other knowledge-intensive domains show analogous task-re-bundling as predictive engines or route optimisers diffuse.

These sectoral snapshots map onto the risk gradients summarised in Table 2.

Table 2: Occupational risk bands for AI substitution (compiled by the author based on [10])*

High risk (≥ 50 % of task hours automatable)	**Medium risk (20–50 %)**	**Low risk (< 20 %)**
Telemarketers, data-entry clerks, cashiers, call-centre operators	Accountants & auditors, radiology technicians, junior software engineers, graphic designers	Teachers, physicians, electricians, psychologists, professional athletes
Postal sorters, bank clerks	Laboratory technologists, journalists, copy-writers	Senior product managers, social workers, craftsmen

* Risk shares integrate OECD task-exposure scores with WEF employer expectations and the regional evidence reviewed in Section 2.

Even in the highest band, outright obsolescence is neither instantaneous nor absolute: the early pattern is task shedding rather than job extinction, followed by upskilling and the emergence of hybrid roles. How those dynamics seed entirely new specialities is analysed in the subsequent Discussion.

The strengthened dataset—global market valuations, cross-country exposure rates and sectoral case studies—provides a robust, quantifiable foundation for evaluating AI's labour-market impact in the next decade.

4. Discussion

4.1 Emergent occupations and skills portfolios

The empirical results confirm a twin dynamic: routine tasks are ceded to software or robots, yet complementary human roles proliferate. The high-risk cohort identified in Table 2 overlaps almost perfectly with the "clerical and data-entry" cluster flagged by the *WEF Future of Jobs 2023* survey, whereas our medium-risk group aligns with occupations that the OECD classifies as "AI-exposed but upskilling-elastic" [6, 12]. That correspondence reinforces the expectation that net employment effects hinge less on outright job destruction than on the speed of role recomposition.

Within that recomposition we already observe at least seven fast-growing specialties:

- Machine-learning engineer / AI architect – designs model pipelines and manages MLOps stacks; demand driven by the one-third share of vacancies now listing AI-exposure skills [5].
- Data analyst / business-process modeller – interprets prediction outputs and embeds them in workflow; 67 % of AI-exposed postings request such competences [5].
- Cyber-security specialist – protects expanded attack surfaces created by algorithmic decision systems.
- Creative AI professional – digital artist or prompt stylist leveraging diffusion/transformer models for content generation.
- AI ethics & legal officer – drafts governance frameworks as regulatory regimes (EU AI Act, US Executive Order 14110) widen liability.
- UX designer for AI interfaces – translates model affordances into intuitive front ends.
- AI trainer / prompt engineer – curates data, ranks outputs and instils instructional alignment.

These roles map onto the three vectors of job creation forecast by the World Economic Forum—AI development, AI democratisation and AI support—and illustrate how displacement pressures in clerical tiers are counter-balanced by growth in data-centric or oversight functions [6].

4.2 Interpreting the quantitative results

Our baseline estimate—28 % of jobs in OECD economies already carrying a high automation share—matches the midpoint of the OECD's cross-country task-exposure model [12] and sits slightly below the IMF's global upper bound of 40 %. The divergence reflects sectoral composition: the OECD metric weights manufacturing and public services more heavily than the IMF's financial-services–dominant sample. Likewise, the projected CAGR of 19 % for AI revenues is consistent with venture-capital deployment rates reported in the OECD *AI Papers* and validates the investment intensity assumed in our accelerated-adoption scenario.

A second point of convergence concerns skill substitution. Vacancy analytics show that three-quarters of AI-exposed roles require project management or cross-functional coordination skills, signalling a shift from purely technical to hybrid techno-managerial profiles [5]. This finding aligns with our sectoral evidence: human labour is retained where judgement, abstraction or interpersonal interaction is essential, while machine learning assumes the repetitive or pattern-matching load.

4.3 Implications for firms, workers and policy makers

- Firms should treat AI deployment as an organisational-capital upgrade, budgeting for continuous model maintenance and for reskilling rather than redundancy pay-outs.
- Workers in clerical or routine cognitive roles face a shortening skills half-life; targeted upskilling in data literacy and prompt engineering offers the highest wage-premium upside.
- Policy makers must re-tool active-labour-market policies: wage insurance alone is insufficient; voucher-based lifelong-learning schemes tied to portable skills credentials appear more congruent with the velocity of technological change.

4.4 Limitations and avenues for future research

The study relies on open-source macro datasets and industry case reports; proprietary corporate data were inaccessible and may reveal different task compositions. Forecast horizons remain short (to 2034) because technology cost curves and regulatory responses are highly uncertain. Finally, the occupational-risk matrix aggregates tasks at the 3-digit ISCO level; micro-task heterogeneity within occupations is therefore understated.

Future work should integrate matched employer–employee panels to capture intra-firm task re-allocation, extend scenario analysis beyond high-income economies, and test causal pathways between AI capital deepening and wage dispersion using granular productivity controls.

In sum, the evidence indicates that AI adoption is simultaneously substitutive and generative: it displaces routinised labour shares while spawning demand for multidisciplinary roles that supervise, integrate and humanise algorithmic systems. Managing that transition—not resisting it—will determine whether the net welfare effect skews towards productivity dividends or structural dislocation.

5. Conclusion

The study corroborates a dual narrative: AI simultaneously substitutes and augments human labour. On the risk side, roughly one job in four within OECD economies already contains a majority share of automatable tasks, and accelerated-adoption scenarios could push that figure towards 40 % by 2030. Displacement pressure is most acute in clerical, routine-cognitive and simple manual occupations. On the opportunity side, market and vacancy data reveal rapid hiring growth in seven multidisciplinary roles—ranging from machine-learning engineering and prompt design to AI ethics and human-centred interface development—mirroring the WEF's projected demand vectors in AI development, democratisation and support.

The article contributes (i) an integrated typology distinguishing traditional from generative systems, (ii) an empirically grounded occupational-risk matrix that synthesises OECD task scores with firm-level expectations, and (iii) a policy-relevant interpretation of how new specialties can absorb displaced labour if reskilling mechanisms are timely and inclusive.

Policy makers should therefore pivot from passive income support to active skill conversion, funding modular, credentialed programmes in data literacy, cyber-security and human-AI interaction. Firms that treat AI as an organisational-capital upgrade—allocating budget for continuous model maintenance and workforce retraining—are likely to capture the productivity premium without incurring reputational or regulatory backlash.

Limitations remain: the analysis relies on open-source datasets, short forecast horizons and occupation-level averaging that masks intra-task heterogeneity. Future research should link matched employer–employee micro-panels with longitudinal productivity data to test causal pathways between AI capital deepening, wage dispersion and social-welfare outcomes across diverse economic contexts.

Managed astutely, AI's net effect can tilt toward higher productivity and richer job content rather than structural dislocation. Whether that promise materialises will depend less on the technology itself than on the speed and equity with which workers, firms and governments orchestrate the transition.

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