Implementation of Zero-Trust Architecture in Mobile Applications of the Financial Sector

Abstract

This article examines the rethinking of zero-trust architecture for mobile applications in the financial sector as a crystallization of the contemporary model of cyber-resilience amid explosive growth in mobile banking and the rise of specialized smartphone attacks. It is demonstrated that traditional perimeter-based security models do not provide the required level of protection in the context of a high density of vulnerabilities in client applications and the exponential increase in malicious activity, which predetermines the relevance of a transition to an approach in which every request and every action is treated as potentially untrusted. The purpose of the study is to conceptualize and specify the principles of zero-trust architecture at the mobile client level. The scientific novelty lies in shifting the center of gravity from an abstract trusted perimeter to a set of explicitly defined decision points across the interface, domain logic, and infrastructural library layers, as well as in introducing an application trust map, standardized interface components as carriers of security policy, and a unified software kit for authentication, session management, and authorization checks. The proposed roadmap, from constructing a trust map to the phased implementation of multi-step, risk-oriented authentication, enables transforming the zero-trust architecture from a one-time initiative into a continuous process embedded in the life cycle of mobile financial product development. The article is intended for researchers, architects, and practitioners engaged in the design and evolution of mobile solutions in the banking and fintech sectors.